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Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: 
Lessons from implementing EU migration policy in Morocco 
 
DANIEL WUNDERLICH 
Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath, Bath, UK. 
 
ABSTRACT. EU external migration policy is contentious in relations with its southern 
neighbours. Policy convergence and differentiation are unlikely outcomes in this setting. 
Against long odds, two-sided policy convergence occurs with considerable scope for 
differentiation. In specific, the analysis of EU policy objectives and implementation in 
Morocco shows the importance of externalities of European integration for achieving co-
operation and ownership over projects. However, the EU’s ability to pursue its restrictive 
policy objectives is impinged by relations between individual member and non-member states, 
intra-EU co-ordination problems and domestic political structures in its partner countries. 
The resulting differentiation processes bring about à la carte co-operation as an unintended 
consequence of EU initiatives on migration. 
 
The European Commission stated the ambitious and certainly long-term objective of 
extending the free movement of people and labour to the Southern and Eastern neighbours of 
the European Union (EU) in its ‘Wider Europe’ communication (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003: 11). This indicates region building ambitions by the EU that 
are at odds with its otherwise internally motivated external migration policy which aims 
largely at exerting stronger control over migratory movements in non-member states. The 
EU’s wish to regulate migration beyond its territory means that it tries to shape the complex 
set of borders of inclusion and exclusion to the state territory of Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMC), to their communities of belonging and labour markets 
(Geddes, 2005). These attempts therefore inevitably impact on any effort to create a denser 
web of relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area that is at the heart of region building at large.  
Region building by means of its external migration policy is not an EU priority. By 
 with  contrast,   migration   control   constitutes   an   EU   priority   in   most   of   its  relations
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SEMC – and moreover is a contentious issue between both sides. While the nature of EU 
objectives leaves little room for normative or sectoral differentiation, the Union depends on 
SEMC to implement policies “on the ground” if it wants to extend its reach and control 
migration beyond the outer Schengen border. i  Policy convergence is however unlikely 
because SEMC hold conflicting interests to the EU migration control agenda. Nevertheless, 
SEMC are increasingly affected by externalities of European integration in form of transit 
migrants to Europe who end up staying in their territories as a result of the fortification of EU 
borders. These externalities contribute to SEMCs’ unease about turning into countries of 
immigration and predispose them to some convergence with EU policy objectives. Can we 
observe policy convergence and differentiation against long odds in this setting? What are the 
factors that account for these processes and what do they mean for region building?  
The region building models by Barbé and Herranz Surrallés provide apt tools to 
evaluate the differentiation dynamics that are observable in EU external migration policy. The 
EU faces structural and political constraints in SEMC that hinder it to impose its internally 
inspired migration policy objectives in this legally non-binding environment. A fine-grained 
understanding of policy convergence is therefore helpful to qualify EU co-operation with 
SEMC without resorting to judgements of “failure” or “success” in this politicized area of co-
operation. The main argument of this article is that the EU’s ability to achieve 
undifferentiated policy transfer is impinged by (1) the influence of bilateral relations of 
individual member and non-member states on the EU agenda and EU relations with SEMC; 
(2) intra-EU co-ordination problems; and (3) EU dependence on actors in SEMC to 
implement its policy objectives that allows them to exert considerable influence on EU policy. 
Geographical, sectoral and normative differentiation processes are the result. Ultimately, EU 
co-operation of migration policy in SEMC sits between the model of differentiated integration 
and à la carte co-operation but in an unintended form than the one envisaged by policy 
objectives manufactured in Brussels. 
After analysing EU policy objectives towards SEMC in the second part of this article, 
member state’s influence and organisational environments in the EU and the partner country 
will be explored in greater detail when looking at implementation dynamics in Morocco in 
part three. The EU finances a range of projects in the country regarding border management, 
labour migration, migration and development and asylum. Insights from the Moroccan case 
may therefore be indicative of similar dynamics of EU co-operation in the region. Insights 
were gained through document analysis and 38 elite interviews in Brussels and Morocco 
between December 2007 and December 2008. 
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 EU EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY: TOWARDS DIFFERENTIATION AND 
POLICY CONVERGENCE? 
 
There is little reason to expect either differentiation or policy convergence in the EU’s 
engagement with SEMC in the area of migration policy. Two reasons lead to this expectation:  
(a) the regulatory nature of EU external migration policy limits the scope for differentiation 
and (b) discrepancies between the EU and SEMC over the content of migration policy restrict 
policy convergence.  
International migration is by definition a cross-border phenomenon. This poses 
challenges to states in their wish to regulate the international movement of people because 
they are limited to the boundaries of administrative and legal influence over their territory 
(Taylor, 1994). States have tried to counter this obstacle by means of international co-
operation in their attempts to exert ‘remote control’ of migratory movements beyond their 
territorial borders (Zolberg, 2005). Although not a state in its own right, the EU also attempts 
to control migratory movements before they reach the outer Schengen border and depends on 
co-operation with SEMC. As a regulatory policy, migration policy mostly aims at fixing rules 
of admission and regulating access to state territory. The nature of these rules as not 
negotiable severely restricts the EU’s scope to move away from its internally inspired policy 
objectives to filter ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ migration or to build up asylum capacities that 
comply with international law. Consequently, the priority status of EU external migration 
policy and its strong normative content leave little room for policy differentiation in SEMC. 
The EU aim to transfer its policy objectives abroad conflicts with SEMC interests with 
regard to their state sovereignty, relations with neighbouring countries in the region and 
internal political dynamics. EU external migration policy touches on sensitive areas of SEMC 
state sovereignty in particular with regard to border control and readmission because 
regulating access to its territory can be seen as the privilege of an independent state. 
Readmission is hereby contentious because the EU does not only want non-member states to 
readmit irregular migrant nationals but also non-nationals to its southern neighbours that 
transited via their territories into the EU. The potential tightening of SEMC border controls as 
an outcome of EU co-operation can also provoke new tensions among the countries in the 
region. Such an outcome would sit uncomfortably with the idea of region building in the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, SEMC are often countries of origin for EU 
immigration and profit from the yearly inflow of remittances. Restricting the movement of 
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their citizens is therefore unpopular with their local populations, affects their socio-economic 
conditions and can cause unfavourable changes to the political climate for the regimes in 
power (Brand, 2006). Given that SEMC (in contrast to EU accession countries) are under no 
legal obligation to accept and implement EU policies, the possibilities of policy convergence 
should be slim despite a power imbalance in favour of the Union in its overall relations with 
SEMC.  
The more surprising is the finding that some EU co-operation with SEMC is taking 
place in the area of migration policy. The external governance literature points out the 
importance of ‘externalities of European integration’ which can increase the possibility of 
policy convergence (Lavenex 2008, Lavenex & Uçarer, 2002). SEMC are increasingly 
affected by EU externalities. EU measures to tighten its border controls hinder irregular 
migrants in transit to the EU to enter its territory. If increasing numbers of immigrants are 
seen in an unfavourable light in SEMC, then these negative externalities of EU integration 
can stimulate SEMC governments to control their borders more vigilantly and engage with 
EU co-operation in this area. In consequence, local actors can adopt ownership over 
restrictive EU policy initiatives and even drive policy convergence.  
Despite SEMC inclinations to bring their policies in line with restrictive EU policies 
as a result of negative externalities, this article highlights three factors that impinge on the 
EU’s ability to pursue its objectives in an undifferentiated way: (1) relations between 
individual member states and SEMC; (2) intra-EU co-ordination problems and (3) the effect 
of organisational environments in SEMC on implementation of EU external migration policy. 
(1) EU relations with neighbouring countries can have repercussions on EU 
governance, a process named ‘internalisation’ by some (Friis & Murphy, 1999: 213). 
The aim to restrict the movement to the Schengen area is driven by member states’ 
concerns about security issues and access to their labour markets and welfare systems. 
Individual member states may be therefore more pressed to obtain some degree of co-
operation with non-member states (leading to differentiated arrangements) than to 
follow EU migration policy as a rigid and undifferentiated framework. In particular 
those member states with an EU outer border are put under pressure by EU legislation 
to restrict entry to their territories because the first country of entry is in charge of 
processing asylum applications in case of an irregular border crossing (Council of the 
European Union, 2003: art. 10). This increases the role of member states over the role 
of EU actors. For example, some SEMC have had continuing success to frustrate 
Community readmission agreements which undermined the Commission’s position 
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vis-à-vis the member states. Despite a decade of negotiations, the Commission was 
unable to conclude such agreements with Morocco (since 2000), Turkey and Algeria 
(both since 2002). In their pursuit to readmit irregular migrants, the member states 
have resorted to sign informalized agreements with non-member states (albeit more 
limited in scope than Community readmission agreements) (Cassarino, 2007). This 
practice violates the Commission’s exclusive Council mandate and weakens its 
standing for future mandates and in driving EU external migration policy.ii EU actors 
may therefore opt to take non-member states’ interests stronger into account and 
accommodate their policy approaches in order to achieve co-operation. Limited policy 
convergence would have the price of geographical, sectoral and potentially normative 
differentiation. 
 
(2) If the EU wants to keep differentiation low, then internal co-ordination between 
Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) is crucial for providing external incentives 
within and across policy sectors. External incentives can tempt SEMC to adopt policy 
objectives and set them into practice without allowing too many concessions to 
particular SEMC that move away from its original policy intentions. As the driving 
actor of external migration policy, DG Freedom, Security and Justice (JLS) has 
triggered tensions with classical external EU actors such as DG Development and DG 
External Relations (RELEX) who felt that their agendas were affected by the 
internally motivated policy objectives of this cross-cutting policy issue (Boswell, 2008: 
499-508). Organisational environments at EU level therefore can limit possibilities for 
policy convergence.  
 
(3) If organisational environments can influence the likelihood of EU co-operation on 
migration policy, then the organisational environments in SEMC are also likely to 
shape EU external migration policy and contribute to dynamics of differentiation – 
especially during the implementation phase. Indeed, the EU already struggles to 
enforce regulations in its own member states (Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001; 
Knill, 2006). The EU depends particularly on non-member state agencies to drive 
implementation of EU external migration policy. Implementation in non-member 
states should not be seen as a non-political process following a hierarchical 
“implementation chain” that translates EU policy objectives into action but as a 
process of continued bargaining over policy output in what has been termed a ‘policy-
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action relationship’ (Barrett & Fudge, 1981). Since the EU is not engaging with a 
primordial soup but with an established organisational context, domestic political 
structures and administrative capabilities in SEMC are crucial factors that mediate EU 
influence as flagged in the EU external governance literature (Lavenex, 2008: 948, 
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 804f). Already at the time of decision-making, 
central governmental actors sit at the negotiation table about intergovernmental 
agreements and are gatekeepers who can hinder legislative changes. Policy 
implementation can revive conflicts between the EU and SEMC which were covered 
up at the time of decision-making. When it comes to the implementation stage, for 
example, central governmental actors can impede the initiation of co-operation with 
local implementing agencies. Implementation has therefore been described as ‘the 
continuation of politics by other means’ (Bardach, 1977: 85). Furthermore, adequate 
resources and trained personnel need to be available as well as agreement over the 
purpose and logic of EU interventions as identified in the implementation literature 
(for an overview see Hill & Hupe, 2002). If the migration policy field is 
underdeveloped in SEMC, EU projects often attempt to build up new organisations, 
restructure responsibilities and finance training and equipment. EU projects therefore 
provide opportunity structures to SEMC actors which can provoke “turf wars” about 
responsibilities and policy influence among implementing organisations. These 
dynamics can contribute to differentiation because EU actors are dependent on local 
implementing organisations in order to set policy into practice and struggle to control 
the policy output of such co-operation. It is therefore crucial to understand the 
organisational context with which the EU is engaging in order to assess the potential 
for differentiation and policy convergence in different SEMC. 
These considerations set the scene for the investigation of differentiation and 
convergence processes between EU and SEMC migration policies. The EU attempts to 
transfer its policy objectives abroad with little scope for differentiation. At the same time, 
these objectives largely conflict with SEMC interests in the area of migration which leave 
little room for policy convergence. Nevertheless, SEMC are possibly inclined to restrict the 
movement of people into their own territories and hereby conform to EU objectives in order 
to respond to externalities of tightened EU border controls. Even so, the EU has to struggle to 
stop differentiation from eroding the transfer of its external migration policy into SEMC 
because: (1) Member states may be more interested in achieving their own migration policy 
objectives than in an undifferentiated EU arrangement which makes both member states and 
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Commission more open to consider SEMC interests to achieve some kind of co-operation; (2) 
EU internal co-ordination problems reduce EU leverage towards SEMC; (3) policy changes 
can occur during the implementation process that are difficult to control for the EU. Do we 
see policy convergence and differentiation against long odds in this setting? What are the 
implications for EU policy outcome and the prospects for region building? This article starts 
the analysis by assessing EU migration policy objectives to the region before turning to EU 
co-operation with Morocco as an exploratory case. 
 
EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY OBJECTIVES: NO SPACE FOR 
DIFFERENTIATION? 
 
In order to be able to assess the scope and nature of differentiation of EU migration policy 
towards SEMC and its role for region building, a close look at EU policy objectives is 
necessary. This section shows that the overall aim of the EU is to enforce stronger control 
measures and to reduce migratory pressure on EU borders. The EU applies this objective 
indiscriminately to SEMC. Where geographical differentiation takes place, this is the result of 
different co-operation stages between the EU and individual SEMC rather than a move away 
from its intransigent policy content. New policy items were added to the list of EU policy 
objectives which contributed to limited policy convergence thanks to the influence of sub-
regional groups and bilateral relations between individual member states and SEMC. 
The 1999 Tampere Council Conclusions (1999b: 3) defined ‘partnership with 
countries of origin’ as a cornerstone of a Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy and set 
the broad objectives for co-operation with non-Member States. The Hague Programme (2005-
2009) and the Stockholm Programme (2010- ) updated their predecessor. They specify the 
aims of bilateral co-operation as improving non-member states’ asylum systems, building-up 
their border control capacities against illegal migrationiii  and organized crime, improving 
document security, installing resettlement programmes as well as Community readmission 
agreements and emphasizes the need to address the ‘root causes of migration’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2004: 20-23 and 2009: 72f, 76). The focus of EU external migration policy 
has been widely criticized as subjugating non-Member States to EU interests, primarily in 
border controls, readmission and shifting asylum pressures outside of EU territory (Lavenex, 
1999; Lindstrøm, 2005; Taylor, 2005). 
What is the scope for policy differentiation in SEMC given the wide range of 
objectives from security concerns, via humanitarian considerations to the “root causes” 
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approach? A look into the multi-annual national action plans which are agreed between the 
EU and the respective non-member state shows the specific aims of the EU in SEMC (Table 
1). The action plans are therefore meant to adapt broader EU policy objectives to the local 
context. The EU makes subsequently funding available to transpose these objectives into 
action by means of concrete initiatives in SEMC. 
Table 1 gives an overview of policy objectives towards SEMC in subfields of external 
migration policy. The dominant EU approaches are restrictive policy and control measures, 
capacity-building and alignment to international conventions with tentative co-operation on 
the side regarding legal migration and the ‘migration-development nexus’ (Nyberg-Sørensen, 
2002). Given the fact that migration policy is by and large a regulatory policy, EU migration 
control objectives offer little space to take account of the diversity of migrant realities in 
different SEMC. 
Although national action plans are based on mutual agreement with SEMC 
governments, they show no significant move away from the EU’s main aims. What appears to 
be differentiation in the case of individual action plans to accommodate to SEMC’ interests is 
the result of co-operation stages. These co-operation stages therefore reflect that the EU 
embraces differentiated integration which allows for geographical and sectoral but not 
normative differentiation. For example, the overall difficult political relations with Syria and 
Libya have hampered bilateral co-operation on migration. In the case of the Palestinian 
Authorities bilateral relations required a different focus altogether which resulted in no 
specification of objectives and measures in the area of migration policy. In a more favourable 
bilateral climate, co-operation often takes the form of ‘dialogue’ and ‘information exchange’ 
which eventually transpire into more concrete measures such as ‘capacity-building’, 
institution-building, legislative alignment and provision of equipment. Finally, Turkey’s 
accession process represents the most advanced stage in terms of breadth and depth of co-
operation objectives.  
Individual member states’ interests to respond to migration flows focus EU interest on 
particular countries and emphasise readmission, asylum and border control co-operation as in 
the cases of Morocco, Libya and Turkey. For example, on the base of bilateral co-operation 
between Italy and Libya, EU initiatives have developed in response to transit migration via 
Libya to southern Italy and Malta (Hamood, 2008). Such co-operation is, however, not 
without a price and allowed Libya to access sophisticated military technology to police its 
borders. iv  In other cases, bilateral relations and sub-regional fora between SEMC and 
privileged interlocutor member states allowed for (limited) influence of non-member states on 
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policy developments at EU level. Although EU initiatives on admission policy (for example 
circular migration schemes) and on “migration and development” are a recent and 
underdeveloped component of EU external migration policy, they are the product of such 
influence and provide evidence of two-sided policy convergence. 
 
Table 1: External migration policy objectives and approaches in ENP action plans and strategy papers towards SEMCs 
 
 
border 
management 
measures against 
human trafficking 
measures against 
illegal migration 
readmission asylum visa migration 
management 
Morocco *capacity-
building 
*equipment 
*information  
exchange 
*capacity-building  
*align legislation to 
international 
standards 
*enhanced co-
operation 
*information 
exchange 
*strategy 
development 
*capacity-building 
*assistance to 
victims 
*information 
exchange 
*regional co-
operation 
*institutional 
support 
*conclude 
and 
implement 
EC 
readmission 
agreement 
*align legislation 
with 1951 
Geneva 
Convention 
*implementation 
*document 
security 
*facilitated 
procedures 
*information exchange   
*public campaigns on 
risks of illegal 
migration and legal 
migration 
opportunities 
*manage legal 
migration 
*multilateral co-
operation    
*explore synergies 
migration and 
development 
Algeria n/a n/a n/a *conclude 
and 
implement 
readmission 
agreement 
n/a n/a *consider development 
of legal migration unit 
*multilateral co-
operation 
Tunisia *capacity-
building 
*dialogue on 
common approach 
*information 
exchange  
*initiate 
negotiations 
*align legislation 
with 1951 
*document 
security 
*promote co-operation 
on legal migration 
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*information 
exchange 
*regional co-
operation 
*capacity-building 
*assistance to 
victims 
*strategy 
development 
*institutional 
support 
Geneva 
Convention 
*implementation 
*dialogue 
on 
facilitated 
procedures 
*manage legal 
migration 
*multilateral co-
operation 
Libya *equipment n/a *dialogue 
*financial 
assistance 
*equipment 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Egypt n/a *promote co-
operation with EU 
*assistance to 
victims 
*regional co-
operation 
*assistance to curb 
illegal migration to 
EU 
*dialogue on 
control of illegal 
migration 
*information 
exchange 
*dialogue on 
return and 
readmission 
*initiate and 
negotiate EC 
readmission 
agreement 
*dialogue on 
asylum 
*information 
exchange 
*document 
security 
*dialogue 
on 
facilitated 
procedures 
*public campaigns on 
risks of illegal and 
opportunities of legal 
employment  
*capacity-building 
*information exchange 
*dialogue on legal and 
seasonal migration 
Jordan *information 
exchange 
*regional co-
operation 
*signing and 
ratification of UN 
convention 
*adapt legislation 
*information 
*information 
exchange 
n/a *dialogue *dialogue 
to facilitate 
procedures 
and 
document 
n/a 
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exchange security 
PA n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Israel *co-operation 
with border 
police against 
illegal migration 
*ratify and 
implement UN 
convention 
*information 
exchange 
*co-operation with 
countries of origin 
and transit 
*information 
exchange 
n/a *exchange of 
information and 
best practise 
n/a *information exchange 
*dialogue on legal 
migration 
Lebanon *practical 
support to 
combat illegal 
migration  
*strategy 
development 
*regional co-
operation 
*capacity-
building 
*equipment 
*possible  co-
operation with 
*implement UN 
Convention 
*adapt national 
provisions 
*exchange 
information and 
expertise and co-
operation 
*assistance to 
victims 
*exchange 
information and 
experience 
*practical support 
of activities 
*review 
policies on 
return of 
illegal 
migrants 
*consider 
negotiation 
on EC 
readmission 
agreement 
*direct co-
operation to 
better living 
conditions of 
refugees 
*capacity-
building 
*exchange of 
information and 
best practices 
*examine 
facilitate 
visa 
procedures 
*document 
security 
 
*information exchange 
*information on risks 
of illegal and 
opportunities of legal 
migration 
*migration and 
development 
*co-operation with 
diasporas 
*facilitating remittance 
flows 
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Frontex 
Syria n/a n/a n/a n/a *consider direct 
co-operation to 
better refugee’s 
living conditions  
n/a n/a 
Turkey *align legislation 
and implement 
border acquis 
*institutional 
restructuring 
*capacity-
building 
*equipment 
*possible 
Frontex co-
operation 
*information 
exchange 
*co-operation on 
dismantling 
networks 
*public information 
campaigns 
*information 
exchange 
*adopt and 
implement acquis 
and best practices 
with view to 
prevent illegal 
migration 
*operational co-
operation  
*conclude 
and 
implement 
EC 
readmission 
agreement 
*liaison 
regarding 
repatriation 
to countries 
of origin 
*respect and 
implement 1951 
Geneva 
Convention and 
acquis 
*capacity-
building 
*align visa 
regulations 
with EU 
regulations 
*document 
security 
 
*information exchange  
*information 
campaigns 
*implement political 
reforms to decrease 
number asylum 
seekers 
*economic 
development to limit 
out-migration 
n/a: not applicable 
Sources: Commission of the European Communities, 2004a; 2004c; 2004d; 2005c; 2006c; 2006d; 2006e; 2006f; 2007; n.d.-a; n.d.-b; Libya & EU, 2006; Interview DG RELEX. 
 
EU external migration policy stated clearly from the beginning the aim to reduce 
migratory movements into member states (Council of the European Union, 1992: annex 5). 
Although the Council Tampere Conclusions (1999b: 3) propagated a ‘comprehensive 
approach to migration’ to achieve ‘co-development’ in the EU and its partner countries, the 
first action plans were seen as unbalanced by the target countries. Morocco demanded for 
example more emphasis on socio-economic aspects rather than security approaches to 
migration (Council of the European Union, 2000: 7). Around the early 2000s, the link 
between migration and development became a fashionable topic for international 
organisations (Lavenex, 2008: 441f). Next to repressive policy measures, the topic also made 
its way onto the agenda of intergovernmental fora together with labour migration. The 5+5 
Dialogue (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta as well as Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya) dealt with these topics from the 2003 Rabat Conference onwards. A 
similar interest emerged at EU level only after the 2005 crisis at Ceuta and Melilla where at 
least 15 people died in the surge of more than one thousand migrants on the two Spanish 
cities and during subsequent deportations (Amnesty International, 2005; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005d). The events made the member states susceptible to the idea 
that the securitarian approach to migration had its limitations and that it stimulated human 
rights violations. This environment provided a window of opportunity for Spain to push for a 
‘Global approach to migration’ in the Council on the base of a Commission Communication, 
which better accommodated Morocco’s wish for a more balanced approach in the EU agenda 
and put stronger emphasis on legal migration and development issues (Council of the 
European Union, 2005; Commission of the European Communities, 2005a). v  Moroccan 
influence on the EU agenda was also traced in documents of JHA sub-committee meetings 
(Lavenex, 2008: endnote 8). EU conferences followed this line with the African Union and 
SEMC in Rabat, Tripoli and Albufeira in 2006.  
  The example shows that discussions at regional co-operation fora can pave the way for 
introducing new strategies at EU level. In a favourable environment, non-member states can 
influence the EU policy agenda where interests converge with their privileged interlocutor 
member states. Policy convergence was however rather superficial and the subsequent policy 
initiatives modest. Regarding labour migration, member states are strongly opposed to 
granting the EU competences regarding admission policies in order to keep the stronghold on 
access to their labour markets. EU policies can therefore at best offer co-operation interfaces 
for migration choisi to non-members as are developing in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia.vi 
Practical elaborations of the migration-development nexus are at an infantile state.vii Despite a 
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respective Commission Communication (2005b), there is limited clarity how to translate the 
link between migration and development into tangible projects. Moreover, development 
agencies have been reluctant to participate in developing this link further out of fear of having 
to compromise their own policy agenda (Boswell, 2008: 502).viii It has been argued that these 
new initiatives have impacted little on the prevailing security oriented EU policy frame and 
that more fundamental re-steering is needed (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008: 453f; Pastore, 2007: 56-
62). It is therefore doubtful in how far regional fora and non-member states’ influence can 
bring about convergence beyond declarations of policy intentions. 
EU funding can tempt SEMC into bilateral co-operation because it allows for 
operations that SEMC might not otherwise consider worth financing themselves. Funding is 
available in form of geographical as well as thematic budget lines in order to implement 
national action plans. Out of a total of about €16.5bn spent on EU external action between 
2002 and 2006ix, around €450m (about 2.7 per cent) were spent on migration related activities. 
These activities centred on border control, the fight against illegal migration and migration 
management with focus in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2006b: 6). Although geographic instruments (formerly MEDA, 
now European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)) allow for regional initiatives and 
cross-border co-operation between SEMC that could counter differentiation dynamics, the 
largest part of this funding goes into national projects. Since the development of regional or 
cross-border initiatives is dependent on the agreement of respective SEMC governments, 
strained bilateral relations between them can provide serious obstacles (for example in the 
case of Morocco and Algeria). In contrast to geographic instruments, national governments 
are not consulted regarding the allocation of project funding under thematic instruments.x 
This reduces the potential for normative and geographical differentiation because Brussels 
can exert stronger control at the planning stage. However, projects under thematic instruments 
have a predominantly national focus and EU dependence on local non-governmental 
organisations and international organisations to implement projects allow for differentiation at 
the implementation stage. 
The analysis of EU policy objectives towards SEMC showed little scope for normative 
differentiation of policy contents. Geographical differentiation only emerged as a result of the 
quality of overall bilateral relations and reflects co-operation stages which follow the model 
of differentiated integration. Concerns about particular migration routes drive affected 
member states to compromise with countries of origin and transit in order to initiate co-
operation. Their role as privileged interlocutors can hence open the way for EU initiatives or 
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put non-member states’ interests on the EU agenda as will be explored in greater detail below. 
Due to the regulatory nature of migration policy, EU interest is set on the enforcement of 
regulations along organisational and territorial state borders. Region-building is not the 
primary aim in this policy field. EU initiatives are hereby aiming at installing a system of 
concentric circles around EU external borders that keep unwanted migration and asylum 
reception further afield. Financial attributions largely focus on projects in individual SEMC 
and do not generate regional initiatives. The availability of EU budget lines with a national 
focus has particular relevance for differentiation at the implementation stage. SEMC 
governments can use their bargaining power vis-à-vis EU actors to request adjustment of 
project outlines and local implementers contribute to normative and sectoral differentiation in 
the region as discussed in the next section. 
IMPLEMENTING EU MIGRATION INITIATIVES IN MOROCCO: AN OPEN 
DOOR FOR DIFFERENTIATION 
Implementation research helps to carry the analysis beyond the level of EU policy intentions. 
It can provide answers to core questions pointed up in the introduction to this volume such as 
who brought about differentiation and convergence as well as why. Answers to these 
questions help to characterise the region building model that fits best for co-operation in the 
area of migration policy. Examples from implementation of EU policy in Morocco reveal the 
importance of bilateral relations between individual member and non-member states, the 
externalities of European integration, EU internal co-ordination problems and domestic 
political structures. These factors provide an open door for differentiation and provide an 
example of a rather unexpected à la carte co-operation. While limited policy convergence is 
taking place, it is not a one-sided process of SEMC aligning with EU policy objectives but 
shows mutual concessions during the translation of policy objectives into “action”. 
Spanish-Moroccan relations and EU migration policy 
The Spanish-Moroccan case illustrates how bilateral relations between individual member and 
non-member states can hinder or facilitate EU co-operation and ultimately policy 
convergence (as seen with the EU ‘Global Approach to Migration’). In response to Moroccan 
irregular immigration during the 1990s, the conservative Spanish government under Aznar 
(1996-2004) wanted to reduce migratory pressure and used EU weight to put Morocco in 
charge. Spanish policy interests were reflected in its draft of the 1999 High-Level Working 
Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) action plan on Morocco which largely focused on 
repressive measures (Council of the European Union, 1999a: 13-20). In response, Morocco 
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stated indignantly that it had not been consulted in its development and criticized its limited 
focus (Council of the European Union, 2000: 7). Its Human Rights Minister Aujjar stressed 
that the country followed ‘a humanist and voluntary approach to migration … which puts 
migrants’ human rights at the centre of preoccupations and rejects any purely securitized 
approach’ (Le Matin, 2002). 
While Spanish-Moroccan co-operation advanced with the 2001 labour agreement, it 
did not trigger the pending implementation of the bilateral 1992 readmission agreement, nor 
did it overcome the lack of co-operation to tighten border controls because Morocco opposed 
the idea of becoming the ‘Gendarme of Europe’ (Belguendouz, 2003). Meanwhile, Spain 
enhanced unilaterally its border surveillance and infrastructure. These measures only 
contributed to divert migration flows (Commission of the European Communities, 2005d; 
Ortuño, 2005) and at best achieved deterrence but not effectively stopped migrants from 
entering Spanish territory (Carling, 2007). Therefore, Spain had an intrinsic interest in co-
operating with Morocco on illegal migration.  
The Aznar government, which had already asked for EU-sanctions against Morocco in 
2001, used its EU-presidency to increase the pressure. After a Spanish-British initiative to 
make development aid conditional on co-operation in migration control had been rejected, the 
Council agreed in its Seville Conclusions (2002: 10) that ‘any future co-operation, association 
or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes 
with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration’. Stressing the need of co-
operation in border control and readmission, the Council (2002: 11) threatened to ‘adopt 
measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European 
Union policies [in the case of an] unjustified lack of co-operation’.  
The Council statement occurred in the context of deteriorating Spanish-Moroccan 
relations: Morocco called back its ambassador in 2001 because King Mohammed VI (1999-) 
complained of ‘frankly hostile positions with regard to politics, economy and security of 
Morocco’ (El País, 2005); and there was sabre-rattling over the disputed uninhabited islet 
Leila/Perejil in July 2002. Simultaneous to the mounting European pressure, Moroccan civil 
society and the media brought to public attention the issue of Moroccan citizens who drowned 
in their attempts to bypass border controls by crossing the Mediterranean in small boats. King 
Mohammed’s approved to engage with irregular migration in 2003 based on internal public 
indignation, EU pressure and reconciliatory steps towards Spain paired with the signature of 
Spanish investment deals worth €390m.xi The King’s approval stimulated the creation of a 
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department on illegal migration within the Interior Ministry; ratification of Law 02/03 as a cut 
and paste from French legislation with a securitized vision of migration (Elmadmad, 2007: 
35); and co-operation with Spain on border controls, monthly meetings between the Interior 
Ministries, information exchange, joined training exercises and readmission of Moroccan 
nationals. In general, Spanish-Moroccan co-operation has been described as good and based 
on trust especially under Zapatero’s government (2004-) with its more appreciative view on 
immigrants.xii EU co-operation with Morocco was strongly influenced by Spanish-Moroccan 
relations. Although informal discussions were running since 1998, EU co-operation on border 
management only went ahead once King Mohammed had agreed to co-operate with Spain in 
2003 and the Commission had made considerable concessions to its Moroccan counterparts. 
Therefore, relations between a member and a non-member state shape policy convergence by 
exacerbating the potential for success or frustration of EU interventions and by channelling in 
non-member states’ interests onto the EU agenda. 
Domestic political structures 
The structure of political systems in SEMC puts central actors in gatekeeper positions of EU 
interventions. Overcoming their vetoes by accommodating their interests means to contribute 
to EU policy differentiation. In the case of Morocco, the King holds most political power 
(McFaul & Cofman Wittes, 2008) and his “royal instructions” (such as those initiating 
Spanish-Moroccan border control co-operation) are crucial for EU interventions to go ahead. 
In addition, the Moroccan Interior Ministry is the opaque centre of power of the political 
system with close links into the Palace and has dominated the country through administrative 
authority, clientelism and nepotism (Vermeren, 2006: 80; Maghraoui, 2001: 14). 
Corresponding to its role as the monarchy’s control body, the Interior Ministry also dominates 
Moroccan migration policy where it is in charge of border controls, the fight against human 
trafficking and illegal immigration (Elmadmad, 2007: 7). Its vision of migration and asylum 
has been described as securitized and is incoherent with that of other ministries focusing on 
the migration-development nexus and labour migration (such as the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and of Employment). xiii  The King and Interior Ministry hence occupy central 
gatekeeper positions at the apex of political power in Morocco. EU co-operation on border 
management in Morocco illustrates this point and reveals that EU concessions to the Interior 
Ministry had distorting influence on seemingly intransigent EU migration policy objectives.  
 
EU-Moroccan co-operation on border controls 
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Looking at EU-border management interventions is of particular interest because they aim at 
influencing central and exclusive activities of sovereign states. In such a setting, it might be 
possible to overcome the opposition from central gatekeepers through normative and sectoral 
differentiation. In consequence, EU-project conditions followed Morocco’s ideas and interests 
and reinforced the Interior Ministry’s position as the central actor of EU migration policy. 
The EU had to compromise part of its objectives and increase funding to achieve co-operation. 
Bilateral border control co-operation is strongly influenced by EU incentives but also shows 
how the Interior Ministry adopted repressive EU policy responses to a changing and 
apparently daunting migration environment that is a consequence of border reinforcement 
along the outer EU border. Ultimately, the effects of reinforced border controls in Morocco 
undermined other EU policy objectives and were detrimental for migrants’ human rights.  
The first plans on an EU border management project with Morocco originated in the 
National Indicative Programme 2002-04 with a MEDA budget of €40m (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001: 45f). The Commission planned implementation for 2003 but 
no progress was made until the royal instructions encouraged the Commission to reiterate its 
co-operation offer (Le Matin, 2003). The project was agreed with the Moroccan authorities in 
2004 and intended to provide new equipment and training for the Interior Ministry. The plan 
was to install mobile detection units to identify and intercept people before leaving the 
Moroccan coast; Spain and France were to provide technical assistance (Lutterbeck, 2006: 72). 
However, the original project never materialized. One can only speculate about the reasons. 
Following interviews at the Commission, the Moroccan Interior Ministry wanted to use the 
money following its own priorities. Instead of controlling the northern and western coast as 
foreseen by the Commission, an increase of Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara was 
likely which was seen as politically contentious in Brussels. xiv  Whether it was the 
Commission or the Ministry that halted the project is unclear but the controversial issues were 
monitoring and control over the project.  
The MEDA border management project only regained momentum after the 2005 
events of Ceuta and Melilla which made sub-Saharan migration a widely visible phenomenon 
in Morocco. The boundary build-up of the Schengen borders since the 1990s had produced 
externalities of European integration which pushed the King and Interior Ministry to take 
action, fill in EU proposals and expand the already mentioned co-operation with Spain. This 
new co-operation willingness shows growing Moroccan concerns about immigration. 
However, co-operation with the EU was not unconditional and required substantial EU 
incentives. 
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The Commission transformed the MEDA-project by adding an additional €27m and 
employing a sector approach. This allowed the Moroccan Interior Ministry to use the overall 
total of €67m following its own priorities, on any border section and apparently without 
Commission monitoring on the use of the money.xv With the project, the Commission aimed 
at supporting Morocco to develop a “migration strategy” by building-up the newly created 
Directorate for Migration and Border Surveillance in the Interior Ministry and a migration 
observatory. The latter was to achieve interorganisational co-ordination and the inclusion of 
actors beyond the hard core of the Interior Ministry (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006a: 10). Project implementation strengthened the Directorate and is still 
ongoing but the Commission has already expressed satisfaction with the results.xvi However, 
if the Commission sees migration observatories as best practise such as those financed in 
Asian Caribbean Pacific countries xvii  and wanted to broaden the dominant securitized 
Moroccan policy perspective on immigration through this project, then its objective failed: the 
migration observatory as an interorganisational platform has never come to life even five 
years after its announcement. Maybe more importantly, the considerable EU-funding 
strengthened the Interior Ministry’s position and re-emphasised its securitized vision of 
migration in the policy field. The EU hence stepped back from its monitoring requirements, 
its concerns over troop deployments to the Western Sahara and the idea of an integrated 
perspective on migration issues in order to achieve co-operation. Although the EU 
intervention’s general focus on migration control was maintained, Moroccan actors engaged 
with the EU agenda largely following their own conditions to respond to externalities of 
European integration that turn transit migration into immigration to Morocco. Meeting stern 
opposition, EU actors were quick to concede in order to achieve co-operation at all. 
Centralized political structures with capable and resourceful gatekeepers can therefore 
contribute to sectoral and normative differentiation of EU policy output. 
 
Towards policy convergence? 
The Moroccan migration policy agenda has since been dominated by largely repressive 
measures (international co-operation in border management and repatriation of irregular 
migrants) juxtaposed with a national development programme (Sghir, 2006). Morocco has in 
effect become the Gendarme of Europe that it never wanted to be largely out of fear of 
increased sub-Saharan immigration. The Head of the Directorate for Migration and Border 
Surveillance stated consequently that the European externalisation of border management was 
‘not an illogical approach, but quite simply, we must be given the financial and logistic 
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resources to fulfil our ambitions’ (Sghir, 2006: 2, author’s emphasis). Although the Moroccan 
authorities now seem to recognize that Morocco is becoming an immigration country the 
(non-)policy is one of toleration rather than engagement. A senior official in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs stressed in a personal interview that ‘If irregular migrants do not cause any 
problems then we do not have a problem. If they cause problems then we need to act’. Abuses 
of migrants’ human rights continue along with Morocco’s reluctance to build up an asylum 
system. EU actors should ask themselves whether this “narrow” policy convergence is 
sufficient for a policy agenda that also emphasizes EU humanitarian ambitions in accordance 
with international obligations. Migrants in transit to Europe might indeed be worse of now 
than before EU co-operation with Morocco. 
EU internal structures 
EU internal co-ordination problems can contribute to differentiated EU policy in SEMC. 
While the role of domestic gatekeepers seems a likely source of policy differentiation, the role 
of EU internal processes may seem less so given that the EU is an ambitious international 
actor which attributes priority status to its external migration policy. However, Commission 
DGs are concerned with their own portfolios and want to protect them where they conflict 
with the internally motivated EU external migration agenda. The result is EU internal co-
ordination problems which undermine EU ambitions of policy convergence as will be 
exemplified regarding asylum policy and the Community readmission agreement with 
Morocco.  
Where EU external migration policy is drawing from law backed by international 
organisations (such as the 1951 Geneva Convention and its guardian, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), the EU uses co-operation with international 
organisations. However, EU internal co-ordination problems undermined rule transfer and 
long-term policy convergence. UNHCR has had a troublesome relationship with the 
Moroccan authorities which led to suspension of co-operation in 2004. After violation of 
refugee and basic human rights in 2005 and 2006 when Moroccan security forces expelled 
migrants into the desert, growing international pressure contributed to Morocco signing the 
2007 accord de siège with UNHCR. The EU supported UNHCR with funding from 2005 
onwards. When EU-funding was running out, UNHCR Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia re-
applied jointly. Instead, EU funding went to Libya which is ‘more en vogue’ as a senior 
UNHCR official commented.xviii It seems that DG RELEX’s aim of expanding its relations 
with Libya overrode the advice of its Commission Delegation in Rabat to continue funding 
UNHCR Morocco, in the light of its continuing problematic relationship with the Interior 
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Ministry and often precarious living conditions of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco (Collyer, 
2006: 21-26).xix Brussels’ decision not to financially support UNHCR activities in Morocco 
therefore undermined EU intentions of building up a Moroccan asylum system at a time when 
it would have been most conducive to policy convergence: first obstacles to further co-
operation were slowly removed; UNHCR had submitted a draft asylum system to the 
Moroccan authorities; and these were conducting study visits to learn from experiences 
abroad. Co-ordination issues between Rabat and Brussels and a lack of feedback and follow-
up can hence seriously undermine EU objectives of approaching international asylum 
standards. It might otherwise appear that the EU is more interested in small-scale (and 
therefore largely symbolic) contributions on the ground and strategic co-operation where it 
seems pertinent (as in the Libyan case) than in establishing consistent long-term policy 
convergence. 
The example of negotiations on a Community readmission agreement with Morocco 
shows the importance of DGs’ protecting their portfolios from contentious policy issues in 
other areas. Now in their fourteenth round since 2003, negotiations on a bilateral readmission 
agreement have been stuck due to ‘technical points’.xx Although Morocco is willing to take 
back its own nationals, the readmission of third country nationals (TCNs) which is at the heart 
of Community readmission agreements is the point of contention. Although conditionality 
across policy areas is legally possible in EU external relations (Cremona, 2008: 11f), it is not 
used to increase leverage in readmission negotiations due to lacking co-ordination between 
DGs.xxi Such co-ordination is hampered because DGs are reluctant to “contaminate” their 
portfolio with other DGs’ priorities as can be seen in the EU-Moroccan negotiations on the 
2008 Advanced Status Agreement. Following the Seville Council Conclusions (2002: 10f), a 
new agreement should have automatically included a readmission clause and the Commission 
had indeed hoped to achieve it with the Advanced Status as a carrot on the negotiation table. 
However, Morocco continued to oppose readmission and DG RELEX did not want to 
jeopardize general progress in bilateral relations because of the readmission issue. After all, 
JHA issues are only one of many priorities in EU-Moroccan relations and “not an objective in 
itself” (COREPER, 2000: 5).xxii The outcome was a clause of soft conditionality which states 
that ‘the EU is ready to develop its co-operation with Morocco [on migration] as soon as the 
negotiations … concerning a readmission agreement will be concluded successfully’ (EU & 
Morocco, 2008: 12f). Although the member states and the Commission may be dissatisfied 
and plans to achieve a Community readmission agreement with Morocco are not abandoned, 
in practical terms this means “business as usual”.xxiii
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 CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS DIFFERENTIATION AND POLICY CONVERGENCE 
The EU has clearly set objectives in its external migration policy towards SEMC. Restrictive 
control measures are at its centre, aiming at reducing irregular migration as well as allowing 
readmission of nationals and TCNs. These objectives should allow for little differentiation. 
Despite the EU aim of policy transfer, limited two-sided policy convergence has been the 
outcome of co-operation due to the contested nature of policy objectives and EU dependence 
on national implementers in partner countries. At the level of policy objectives, sub-regional 
dialogue and relations between individual member states with SEMC have introduced new 
policy approaches to the EU agenda. However, these have materialized into limited policy 
output with the effect of sectoral and normative differentiation. Therefore, EU policy retained 
its focus on repressive measures mainly due to member states’ reluctance to concede on 
admission policies and due to a lack of clarity of the migration-development nexus.  
Implementing EU migration policy in Morocco may be indicative for the potential of 
differentiation and policy convergence with SEMC. Spanish-Moroccan relations exacerbated 
the potential for facilitating and frustrating EU initiatives in this contentious policy field. 
Interdependence between both sides of the Mediterranean stimulates differentiation and 
limited policy convergence. The externalities of European integration in form of a changing 
migration reality in SEMC motivate local actors to adopt ownership in EU co-operation on 
border controls. Although policy convergence to EU policies can be observed, the EU needed 
to go a long way to achieve co-operation at times. Concessions to central political actors in 
SEMC were made and control loosened over policy interventions. This normative and 
sectoral differentiation can provoke adverse effects on policy convergence by undermining 
those parts of the EU external migration package that focus on human rights and international 
commitments such as the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.  
Apart from central SEMC actors that function as gatekeepers of EU initiatives, EU 
internal processes also contribute to differentiation. Co-ordination issues in the European 
Commission limit EU leverage in negotiations with SEMC. In addition, DGs do not want to 
jeopardize their own portfolios because of non-co-operation on migration issues even though 
migration is considered an EU priority policy area. These processes can undermine 
conditionality, project follow-ups and long-term policy convergence.  
Normative and sectoral differentiation processes were crucial for achieving co-
operation between the EU and SEMC. While they contributed to limited policy convergence, 
region building efforts were affected in an unintended manner from an EU perspective. The 
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ENP framework of national action plans allows functional considerations to drive EU 
engagement with SEMC in the area of migration policy corresponding with the model of 
differentiated integration. This move takes account of the co-operation stages of overall 
bilateral relations but leaves the overall normative framework of EU policy objectives 
apparently untouched. However, when looking further afield at implementation dynamics in 
SEMC, co-operation rather fits the label à la carte. Member- and non-member state relations, 
EU co-ordination problems and implementation in SEMC bring about far more differentiation 
dynamics than the EU would like and frustrate largely region building following a model of 
differentiated integration. À la carte co-operation becomes a last resort to achieve any 
bilateral co-operation at all on migration rather than a conscious framework of EU region 
building in SEMC. 
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